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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to present in a complete way the kernel of such a production. 
People migrate and this decision is sometimes permanent, but there are links with the 
country of origin that stand up to time and distances. With respect to this, the so called 
economic diaspora well depicts the broad transnationalism that has established as a 
consequence of the increasing amount of money migrants have been sending back home. 
The data collected and the estimates fully agree on this positive trend but the outlines of 
these peculiar private capital flows are still controversial. This is due to three aspects each 
section of this work tries to address. The first part analyses those remittances’ features on 
which the results of the econometric studies are still causing discussion: stability, 
cyclicality and sustainability. The second one deals with the reasons why people do remit, 
concluding that the world is more balanced than a clear-cut division between behavioural 
and economic motives. Finally, the third one tries to go through the relationship between 
remittances and development, topic on which lots of studies have been conducted but that 
is still far from a comprehensive and convincing conclusion. 
 
Keywords: migration, diaspora, remittances, development, household, transnationalism 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Migrants’ remittances commonly refer 
to certain transactions that are initiated by 
individuals living or working outside their 
countries of birth or origin and related to their 
migration. However, if we want to provide a 
more formal definition (World Bank 2006), 
three items under which remittances are 
encountered (OECD 2005) into the IMF 
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 
(IMF 2004) need to be considered. These are 
compensations of employees, workers’ 
remittances and migrants’ transfers 
(Straubhaar 2005). The first category belongs 
to the subsection income and comprises 
wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by 
individuals in economies other than those in 
which they are residents, for work performed 
for and paid for by residents of those 
economies. The second one, belonging to the 
sub-category current transfers, covers current 
transfers by migrant (World Bank 2005) who 
are employed in new economies and are 
considered residents there. Finally, the third 
one that is accounted into the capital transfers 
arises in correspondence to the migration of 
individuals from one economy to another 
(Mannan & Kozlov 1997). It is made up of 
three components: the flow of goods 
(personal effects) accompanying the migrant, 
his flow of financial assets and the change in 
the stock positions due to the change in his 
residence status (IADB 2006). All these data, 
like all the other components contained into 
the balance of payments framework, are 
compiled by relevant statistical authorities in 
member countries such as the central bank or 
the national statistical office who then report 
them to the Statistics Department of the IMF, 
where global tables are compiled and 
published in the annual report. 
Nevertheless, the data contained in the 
BOPSY are far from being perfectly 
estimated so that any data comparison and 
aggregation have to be approached with 
caution (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2006). First 
of all, aggregate data are subject to variations 
of compilation on a national basis as a 
consequence of a variety of concepts and 
methodologies that are not uniformly applied 
across all countries. With regard to this, the 
definition of residence is one of the most 
critical since some countries still consider 
their nationals working abroad for a year or 
longer as national residents and therefore 
their earnings as compensations of 
employees, simply because they maintain 
strong linkages with their home country. 
Secondly, data sourcing and compilation is 
better in some countries than others, leading 
up to the fact that some of them do not report 
all the items to the Fund or, at worst, they do 
not send any data at all.  
Apart from terminological issues, in 
most of the cases, data weaknesses and 
omissions depend on the difficulties in 
obtaining all necessary data (World Bank 
2006). The system through which 
remittances can be transferred is, indeed, 
multidimensional. The broadest distinction is 
between formal and informal channels 
(Mannan & Wei 2009), whose regularity 
depends on the possibility that the flows can 
be systematically and formally collected. The 
former include hand deliveries by the migrant 
himself or by a courier, ordinary mail, 
informal geographical systems such as 
hawala (in Pakistan and Bangladesh), hundi 
(in India and Nepal) or mulas (in Cuba), and 
ethnic stores. Even if the way of naming the 
system of transferring money differs from 
one country to another (and among the 
systems mentioned, ‘feich’ien’ (in China), 
‘chits/chops’ (in China) have to be added too) 
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the mechanism is almost the same 
everywhere: the trust (Puri & Ritzema 1999). 
It involves two intermediaries. The first 
intermediary (called the ‘hawaladar’ or the 
‘mula’) in the sending country (country A 
henceforth) receives funds in one currency 
from a person from country A to be 
transferred to another person in the recipient 
country (country B henceforth). The person 
in country A receives a code for 
authentication proposes. The hawaladar then 
instructs his correspondent in country B to 
pay an equivalent amount in local currency to 
the designated beneficiary, who needs to 
disclose the code to receive the funds. 
According to the IMF there is a positive 
correlation between the limits of a country’s 
financial capacity and the degree of 
informality of its transfer system (IMF 2005). 
However, comparative costs of transfers 
(IMF 2002) have also to be mentioned as 
contributors to a fertile environment where 
informal channels can develop. As far as the 
tradeoff between them and formal channels is 
concerned, migrants often prefer to risk more 
instead of sending their money through 
regular ways (Roberts & Morris 2003). The 
latter encompass postal services, banks, 
credit unions and money transfer companies. 
Migrants behave very differently with respect 
to them. The Mexican migrants in the United 
States, for example, are sceptical as regards 
the banking system and so prefer sending 
their money home through international wire 
transfer services (NELM 2003), such as 
Western Union (OECD 2005) or Money 
Gram, even if it is much more expensive 
(Leon-Ledesma & Piracha 2004). The costs 
related to the fees or the minimum balance 
the intermediaries fix to transfer remittances, 
plus the nature of passive consumers of the 
Latin migrants with respect to technology, 
and the legal status that prevents them from 
using this kind of service (Suro et al 2002), 
contribute to this.  
On the other hand, Turkish banks, such 
as the Turkiye Is Baankasi or the TC Ziirat 
Bankasi, are the most important channels for 
the transmission of remittances from 
Germany to Turkey (OECD 2005). They are 
estimated to account for more than a half of 
all remittance transactions. This is especially 
due to quite low fees. Finally, the migrants 
from the MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) countries and East Europe in both 
Italy (Mannan & Krueger 2002) and Spain 
usually use postal services to send their 
money back home. From the Nineties the 
Eurogiro, which is a collaboration network of 
postal banks, has operated in direct 
cooperation with the Universal Postal Union 
to promote new solutions for postal financial 
organizations worldwide (Mannan & Kozlov 
2003). Its strength has been its new, close, 
and friendly approach to migrant customers 
and the fact to have become quite widespread 
all over Europe. It indeed operates in more 
than 30 countries (including the European 
Union). 
After having said what remittances are 
and how they can be transferred by migrants, 
we portray their geographical distribution. In 
most cases remittances, relative to other 
macroeconomic indicators, are significantly 
higher in low and lower middle income 
countries than in the other developing 
countries (El-Sakka & Mcnabb 1999). They 
follow two main directions. The first one is 
that from developed to developing countries, 
in other words they move from the North to 
the South. While the second one is between 
developing countries, hence from South to 
South. The top receiving continent is Asia 
with its 40-46% of the annual total flows, the 
second one is the Latin America and 
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Caribbean Area with their 17-22% of total 
flows and finally Central and Eastern Europe 
(15-18%). For countries instead, the first 
three recipients are India, China and Mexico 
in total terms and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Haiti and Lesotho in relative terms (as a share 
of national GDP). Finally, as far as sending 
countries are concerned, the World Bank has 
estimated that the United States and Saudi 
Arabia are the main pools of origin (Quibria 
1997). 
The scholars have spent much of their 
work discussing and testing three features 
related to remittances: stability, cyclicality 
and sustainability. They all describe 
remittances’ behaviour through time and 
space but from different points of view. 
MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
Stability, in the sense of low volatility 
(World Bank 2004), consists of being less 
affected by the impact of favourable and 
unfavourable shocks than other capital flows 
(Mannan & Krueger 2004). In other words, 
they would suffer less from any sharp 
withdrawal or euphoric surge that 
characterize foreign direct investments and 
development aid towards emerging markets 
(Terry et al 2004). The rationale is behind the 
trend of the finance for development as a 
whole in the last twenty years. So if we 
compare their components, remittances have 
not only had a positive (or much more 
positive than ODA’s) trend but it has also 
been much more stable (World Bank 2004) 
than the others’. According to the OECD, 
while FDI and capital market flows fell 
sharply from 2000 due to the recession in the 
high income countries, migrants’ remittances 
continued to grow, reaching USD 149.4 
billion in 2002 (Lucas 2004). And for the 
World Bank they would have amounted to $ 
167 billion in 2005, up from $ 160 in 2004. 
In several recipient countries, remittances in 
2004 largely exceeded the volume of ODA, 
and in certain case even that of the FDI or of 
income from the export of good and services. 
But what is striking is not only their positive 
trend but also their steady way of reacting to 
unexpected economic events (Mannan & 
Kozlov 1995).  
This would be due to two peculiar 
characteristics that distinguish them from 
FDI and ODA. They are private and 
characterized by altruism and solidarity 
motives that are supposed to remain stable. 
So if we look at the figures provided by the 
International Organization for Migration 
(Ghosh 2006), we can see that from 1995 to 
2004 remittances have grown from 58 to 160 
US $ billion, FDI from 107 to 166 US $ 
billion, while ODA to 59 to 79 US $. And, 
even from 1998 to 2001, when private capital 
flows declined in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis, remittances to developing 
countries have continued to rise. 
Furthermore, if we consider the allocation of 
remittances, those intended for consumption 
would be less volatile than those intended for 
investment. Migrants may indeed increase 
remittances in times of economic hardship, 
especially in low income countries where 
their families may depend significantly on 
remittances as a source of income and may 
live at close subsistence levels. And even 
when the purpose behind is investment, 
remittances are less likely to suffer from 
those up and downs that characterize 
portfolio flows to emerging markets. This 
depends on migrants’ stronger propensity to 
invest in their home country despite 
economic adversity than foreign investors’ 
(Orozco 2004). 
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In addition, even when exceptions could 
be made to remittances’ response to dramatic 
changes in economic activity in recipient 
countries, the decline of remittances and 
volatility have been smaller than those of 
other capital flows, meaning they are affected 
by the investment climate in recipient 
countries in the same manner as capital 
flows, though to a much lesser degree. In the 
Philippines, for example, remittances rose 
steadily as the investment climate improved 
in the early Nineties, becoming more volatile 
following the financial crisis in the late 1990s 
(Burgess & Haksar 2005). Similarly, 
Turkey’s remittance receipts increased for 
most of the 1990s but suffered a decline as 
the economy slipped into the crisis in 1999 
and 2000. Estimates from the World Bank 
confirm such a trend after cross countries 
comparisons of workers’ remittances receipts 
relative to some key indicators as corruption, 
inequality, financial development 
(M2/GDP), openness (trade/GDP), domestic 
debt (debt/GDP) and country risk 
(institutional investor rating).  
So remittance receipts averaged 0.5% of 
GDP in countries with a higher than median 
level of corruption, compared to 1.9% in 
countries with lower than median corruption. 
Countries that were more open or more 
financially developed (Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz 2006) also received larger 
remittances. On the other hand, stability is 
sometimes tested through the evidence of 
altruistic motives behind the decision to remit 
(Bouhga-Hagbe 2004; 2006) seeming 
reasonable that these motives remains firmly 
fixed. This can be captured in the following 
way: a negative long run correlation of 
remittances with wage in the home country, 
or a negative correlation between transfers 
and real GDP in the home country, or a 
positive correlation between remittance and 
income in the country of residence. It is 
important to remark that stability can be also 
intended in the sense of resistance to the 
sending country’s economic activity. As 
regards to this, the nexus between US 
business cycle and workers’ remittances have 
also been studied, leading again to a steady 
reaction as far as the latter are concerned 
(Suro et al 1999). 
Since much more work needs to be done 
to compare remittances, FDI and ODA, but 
everybody seem to agree on the reliability of 
the results, it is worth mentioning what the 
IOM is worrying about stability. First of all, 
they claim that gross inflows of remittances 
should be adjusted against the recorded debts 
in the balance of payments framework, 
especially for those countries that are at the 
same time recipient and sending ones. 
Otherwise, overestimation can be a possible 
biased result. Secondly, they suggest 
migrants remittances are not considered a 
substitute for ODA, that are transactions 
between governments, hence bound to 
projects to be implemented in the recipient 
country. 
The starting point for defining 
cyclicality is a recent work (Kaminsky et al 
2004) in which this property is described as 
the correlation between the cyclical 
components of net capital flows into a 
country and its output. The migration 
literature has then borrowed this definition 
for depicting the relationship between the 
cyclical components of remittances and 
recipient countries’ level of GDP growth. So, 
remittances are said to be countercyclical 
when the correlation between their cyclical 
components and output is negative (positive), 
in other words, the economy would borrow 
from abroad in bad times (remittances in/out) 
and would lend (borrow) in good times 
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(remittances out/in). On the other hand, they 
are a cyclical when the above correlation is 
not statistically significant, meaning that the 
pattern of international borrowing and 
lending is not systematically related to the 
recipient country’s business cycle. The 
reason why the debate among scholars is so 
heated on this issue depends on the 
possibility for countries of using or intending 
to use future potential remittances as 
collateral for international loans in periods of 
economic downturn in order to overcome 
liquidity constraints. 
As for stability, the critical starting point 
for dealing with cyclicality are the 
assumptions behind the decision to remit 
(Mannan & Kozlov 1999). As a matter of 
fact, the literature is divided into two streams 
of thought depending on the prevalence of 
consumption smoothing or portfolio motives. 
If the former is assumed, counter cyclicality 
is straightforward. Remittances would be 
compensatory in the sense that they would 
compensate for poor economic performance 
in the home country. On the other hand, pro-
cyclicality would be linked to a search of 
investment opportunities, because migrants 
would tend to send their remittances when the 
economic situation in the country of origin is 
favourable. 
Moreover, three other variables need to 
be considered. First of all, the passage of 
time, since it may change the cyclical 
properties of remittances. Then the economic 
situation in the country of destination needs 
also to be encountered. Regarding to this, 
even if remittances move counter cyclically 
with the output in the home countries of 
migrant workers, the cycle in home and host 
country economies may move together in 
synchrony, thereby making it difficult for 
migrant workers employed in a crisis-struck 
economy to help out family members facing 
similar conditions back home (Sayan 2006). 
Finally, the average level of remittances on 
which the recipient country can count matters 
a lot. 
The formal way cyclicality can be tested 
consists of evaluating the country 
correlations between the cyclical components 
of remittances and GDP. First of all, the trend 
within each series need to be removed to 
identify stylized facts of business cycles and 
analyze cyclical nature of remittance 
receipts. De-trending each series by 
removing the estimated trend makes it 
possible to separate fluctuations around the 
trend of each data series, making examination 
of the statistical properties of the co-
movements of deviations of output and real 
remittances from their respective trend. 
When respective trends are properly filtered 
out from real remittances and output series 
for each country, the remaining cyclical 
components would be stationary with zero 
mean for each variable. Then, 
contemporaneous and asynchronous cross 
correlations between the cyclical components 
of respective series can be calculated to 
identify cyclical characteristics of 
remittances. Pro-cyclicality of remittances in 
this context refers to the tendency of real 
remittances to move above its trend, 
whenever the corresponding real output 
variable is above its respective trend. In the 
absence of such a tendency, remittances and 
output are said to be a cyclical. 
A step beyond cyclicality has been 
recently made in order to assess if financial 
development smoothes or amplifies the 
cyclicality of remittances (Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz 2006). Assuming portfolio motives 
behind the decision to remit, the authors try 
to address if more developed financial 
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systems are associated with more or less pro-
cyclicality. The a priori paradoxical result 
suggests that remittances are more pro-
cyclical in countries with shallower financial 
systems, namely that migrants tend to seek 
more investment opportunities in countries 
with less developed financial sectors, while, 
on the other hand, remittances are more 
countercyclical in countries with deeper 
financial systems. If these results were going 
to be confirmed the macroeconomic 
consequences would be of great value 
(Kireyev 2006). 
Sustainability implies the relationship 
between migrants’ duration of stay in the 
destination countries and the level of 
remittances sent back home (Mannan & 
Krueger 1996). One of the oldest and 
influential article on remittances already used 
to deal with this third and last remittances’ 
feature, highlighting an inverse relationship 
between the two variables (Lucas & Stark 
1985). The rationale for the negative sign is 
related to the diminution and at worst the 
cease of the remittances transferred to the 
home country as time goes by. In particular, 
it is argued that this is a feature that would 
manifest after five year of permanence 
abroad. 
The subsequent literature, except for the 
initial piecewise increasing behaviour, has 
been firmly confirming the same 
conclusions. And what is more important is 
that any assumption related to the motives of 
remitting (either altruistic or self-interested) 
is not conditional (Gerard-Varet et. al 2001). 
So, for example, if pure portfolio motives are 
present, the migrant would remit since he 
expects to come back home sooner or later. 
But if at the end he does not, pure self-
interested motivations would have no sense 
and remittances would start to decrease or 
cease (Mannan & Wei 2008). This is why an 
interesting analysis could be conducted 
exploring the relationship between the 
circulation of the highly skilled people and 
the intention to remit (Docquier & Marfouk 
2004).  
The result, meaning a positive 
relationship, could lead to another conclusion 
in favour of the so called ‘brain circulation’ 
(Desai et al. 2001).  On the other hand, if 
altruistic reasons are present, the ties with the 
home country can become less stringent in 
time (Stark 2005). Finally, even in presence 
of what are called ‘enlightened self-
interested’ motives the negative relationship 
holds. What is assumed behind this last case 
is the presence of an ‘informal contract’ 
between the migrant and the family left in the 
country of origin (Mannan & Wei 2007). So 
the intention of the former, for example, 
would be that of repaying the latter for the 
costs due to his human capital formation 
incurred before the departure, but once they 
have expired the level of the transfers would 
tend to weaken (Mannan & Kozlov 2001).  
The IOM has recently argued that a 
crucial moment towards the negative 
relationship between the time spent abroad 
and the intention to remit, is the change in the 
legal status of the migrant or the acquisition 
of an open-ended labour contract, since they 
would accelerate the weakening of the bonds 
with the sending countries. As regards to this, 
we could perform the nexus between the 
number of permanent visa issued by a 
country of destination and the change in the 
amount of remittances in the respective 
countries of origin of the migrants. We 
should expect a negative coefficient if the 
lack of sustainability holds. 
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Concerning the definition of 
sustainability but taking in consideration just 
the propensity to remit of the highly skilled 
migrants, a remarkable step forward as far as 
both the brain drain and the remittance 
literature are concerned has been taken in the 
last few years (Faini 2006; 2005; 2004; 
2002). Given that skilled migrants tend to 
stay longer in the host country and are more 
likely to family reunifications, the inverse 
relationship between the time spent abroad 
and the intention to remit holds whenever the 
so called ‘reunification effect’, meaning the 
intention of the migrant of living with his 
family in the host country, is stronger than the 
so called ‘wage effect’, the potential increase 
of the amount remitted due to the higher skills 
embedded by the migrant. In addition to this, 
we have also to say that the fact that the 
brains usually come from relatively wealthier 
families can matter and so needs to be 
controlled (Commander et al 2003). 
We could question whether a negative 
sustainability associated to a steady increase 
of the total amount of remittances can be 
considered a contradictory result. In our 
opinion, this is not. If we, indeed, consider 
the figures of the total migration flows in the 
last two decades, we can see that despite the 
restrictive policies adopted by recipient 
countries, numbers have continued to rise 
(Fargue 2006), strongly conditioning 
remittances’ trend more than a still vague 
remitting behaviour. 
When considering a micro approach to 
remittances, the question why migrants 
decide to give up fractions of their disposable 
income to send them back to their country of 
origin needs to be answered. We first deal 
with the most general framework that can be 
assumed considering jointly what the New 
Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), 
the life course’s argument and the articles on 
social networks have separately dealt with, 
and then we shift from it to a more specific 
and rigorous classification of the remitting 
decisions  (Taylor 1999; Mannan & Krueger 
1998). The rationale is that, behind the most 
common motives encountered by the 
literature on remittances (Rapoport & 
Docquier 2004), different kinds of human 
beings are present, and beyond them an 
unevenly influential background made up of 
many components. These can be classified in 
the following way: 
The level of education of the migrant, his 
language skills, his level of integration in the 
host country and the role of the social 
networks are crucial variables. Regarding the 
last one, three approaches have been 
proposed (Piotrowski 2006): social networks 
of migrant in the destination country, social 
networks spanning destination and origin 
communities created by circulation of 
migrants, household’s social networks at 
origin. In particular, as far as the third one is 
concerned, measures from sibling and rice 
harvest help networks can be used (Munshi 
2003). 
Employment of the migrant (fixed or 
open-ended contract), level of income in the 
host country, level of income of the 
household in the home country, needs-tested 
transfers received by the migrant in the 
country of destination (Lowell & DeLa Garza 
2000)., and income risk belong to this 
economic component. In particular, the last 
variable can be studied either from a 
migrant’s (host economy’s risk variables) or 
from his household perspective (origin 
country’s income risk). 
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The time spent abroad by the migrant, 
the nature of the migration decision 
(endogenous or exogenous), which kind of 
laws concerning family reunion are present in 
the destination country, how is the procedure 
for obtaining the legal status there, and the 
state of the naturalization status of the 
migrant matter a lot (Devorets & Vadean 
2005). It is reasonable to expect that there are 
some macroeconomic factors, both in the 
host and in the home country, which may 
significantly affect the migrant’s portfolio 
management choice, hence the flows of 
remittances (Gupta 2005). They can be the 
following ones: interest rate differential, the 
level of inflation, the financial spread, the 
black market premium, exchange rates, and 
national policies implemented as incentive 
schemes, political stability (Tunkay et al 
2005). 
Which of these components is then 
significant or how some of them can combine 
together determine the peculiarity of each 
single micro-framework (Siddiqui & Abrar 
2003). The literature distinguishes among 
pure altruism, self-interested motives, loan 
repayment and insurance motives. Under the 
first case, the migrant derives utility from the 
utility of those left at home since he concerns 
about them. This is the most intuitive, tested 
and widespread presumption. It implies that 
remittances increase with migrant’s income 
and degree of altruism, and decrease with the 
recipient’s income and, more interestingly, 
degree of altruism. But, since the parameters 
concerning the degree of altruism cannot be 
observed, the main testable implications are 
those related to the economic and 
demographic components described above. 
First, the amount of remittances should 
increase with the migrant’s income. 
Secondly, transfers cannot increase with the 
recipient’s income. Thirdly, the sustainability 
of remittances should be inversely related to 
the presence of key members of the family in 
the country of destination. Fourth, counter 
cyclicality should hold. 
On the other hand, behind self-interested 
motives, there is a migrant that considers just 
the advantage to himself when making 
decisions, and acts for his own benefit. On 
this regard, many situations can be thought 
of. He can remit money as to buy various 
types of services such as taking care of his 
assets or relatives (children, elderly parents) 
at home. Then remittances can be driven by a 
‘biased altruism’ (Lucas & Stark 1985), 
under which the aspiration to inherit is 
powerful (Hoddinott 1994), or by the 
intention of acquiring or enhancing prestige 
in his country of origin’s local community 
(Massey & Basem 1992). 
Finally, remittances can also be 
instrumental in reaching a predetermined 
saving target or in investing in real estates 
(Merkle & Zimmermann 1992). From all 
these frameworks, it is evident how one of the 
presumption behind pure self-interest is the 
migrant’s intention to return to his country of 
origin, hence his strong ‘home attachment’. 
In this case, testable implications could be 
again those related to the demographic and 
the income components but also to the macro 
framework (Thieme & Wyss 2005). First, 
sustainability should hold as long as the 
migrant stays abroad but then, after his 
departure, should drop at once. Secondly, the 
amount transferred should increase with the 
level and the quality of the service to be 
offered, increase with the level of migrant’s 
income too, but should react ambiguously to 
an exogenous increase in the recipient’s 
income ((Thieme 2002). 
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We can reasonably argue that 
remittances in both the inheritance and the so 
called ‘exchange’ (Rapoport & Docquier 
2004) perspectives, take place when there is 
a welfare gain for all the parties concerned. 
So, except in the case of perfect mutual 
altruism, some arrangements need to be 
reached between the senders and the 
receivers (Djajic 1998; 2001). Two variables 
generally matter a lot. The first one is the role 
of the bargaining power, especially in the 
former framework, while punishment devices 
and social norms affect the latter one. So, in 
the first case a testable implication could be 
the inverse correlation between the 
unemployment at home and the level of 
transfers sent home. Since it is assumed that 
the level of education and the employment 
condition give more bargaining power to the 
related party. While, on the other hand, in the 
second case, the amount of remittances 
should increase with the remaining 
household’s assets and income, the 
probability of inheriting, the migrant’s 
wealth and income, and should decrease with 
the his own degree of risk aversion. 
Since both pure altruism and pure self-
interest alone may be inadequate or partially 
explanatory in describing the extent and the 
variability of remittances, an alternative 
theory is therefore provided, viewing 
remittances as part of an intertemporal, 
mutually beneficial contractual arrangement 
between migrant and home (Amuedo-
Dorantes, & Pozo 2006). It is important to 
stress that this theory (called as ‘tempered 
altruism’ or ‘enlightened interest’) is not 
merely the intersection of pure altruism and 
pure self-interest but rather offers a quite 
separate set of hypotheses.  
 
The first hypothesis consists of the 
endogenous nature of the remitting decision 
(Agarwal & Horowits 2002). This means that 
it is one of the consequence, if not the most 
important one, of the decision to remit. This 
originates from the household’s evaluation 
which considers a Pareto-superior strategy to 
allocate certain members of the family as 
migrants, and manages remittances as the 
mechanism for redistributing the gains. The 
second hypothesis is that arrangement 
between the migrant and the family are 
voluntary and thus must be self-enforcing. 
The third set of hypotheses is related to the 
prevalence of one of the following 
components: investment or risk (Mannan & 
Wei 2006). If the former exists, remittances 
can be seen as a loan repayment, while in the 
latter case they become part of an insurance 
contract. 
In the first case, that of a loan agreement 
model, remittances serve as repayment (once 
the investment starts to pay off) for both the 
pre-migration investments in the migrant’s 
human capital and the migration costs, under 
the assumption that the ‘parent company’ 
(Poirine 1997) has before lent to the future 
migrant to finance his education in the home 
country and his establishment in a foreign 
country, where returns on investment seem 
higher than in the country of origin (Galor & 
Stark 1990). There exist even more 
complicate loan agreement models in which 
remittances continue to be sent by the 
migrant even after the total repayment of both 
the education and migration costs incurred by 
his family. It is assumed a second stage in 
which migrant remittances are loans made by 
migrants to young relatives to finance their 
education, until they are themselves ready to 
migrate.  
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Finally, in a third stage remittances 
would be either a sort of retirement subsidy 
paid by this new generation migrant to the old 
one once having come back in the country of 
origin, or self-interested transfers made by 
the old migrant with the intention of ensuring 
his own assets at home on his return.  Since 
both education and migration are costly we 
can imagine that just richer families can take 
advantage from such an investment 
opportunity, where the richer the family the 
higher its bargaining power. Testable 
implications of this framework can be the 
positive relation between remittances’ 
sensitivity and migrant’s income, migrant’s 
education and the distance from the family. 
At the same time, the adverse short run 
shocks in recipient economy should 
positively affect remittance transfers too, but 
the effect of recipient’s long run income is 
controversial. Finally, higher unemployment 
at home, increasing the value of education, 
should increase the level of remittances from 
abroad. 
In the implicit co-insurance model, two 
kinds of hypotheses are assumed. They imply 
either being insured from the migrant’s point 
of view from the income risk in the country 
of destination and being insured from the 
household’s point of view from income risk 
in the home country. So, in the first step the 
migrant is the insuree and his household the 
insurer: the family pays for the migration 
costs and for possible initial expenses in the 
destination country. While, in the second one, 
the inverse holds: migrant remittances insure 
for unanticipated household’s income 
shortfall (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2006).  
This kind of model is widespread 
especially in rural areas of low income 
countries where income volatility, 
fragmentation of the financial markets and 
poor insurance markets give rise to a variety 
of such informal contracts (Freund & 
Spatafora 2005). Foreign markets shocks are 
generally uncorrelated to those in the home 
country, so families think that migration 
could be a source of income in case of future 
agricultural drops. As far as the testable 
implications are concerned, the insurance and 
the altruistic motives share similar 
predictions with respect to the sign of the 
effects of income levels on the amount 
remitted. However, they differ with respect to 
the predicted timing of remittances, since 
remittances for insurance motives are more 
likely when income at origin is more volatile, 
meaning they should be sent on a more 
irregular basis. 
Obviously, one should not expect 
remittances to be driven by a single motive. 
In reality, a combination of different motives 
applies, with the exact mixture varying over 
time and places. This is due not only to the 
fact that different individuals may be 
heterogeneous in their motivations to remit, 
but also that different motivations to remit 
may coexist within the same individual. 
However what the evidence seems to confirm 
is the constant presence of altruistic 
components behind the migrant’s decision to 
send money back home. 
REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT 
Following the definition of economic 
development as a multidimensional approach 
that takes into consideration not only 
economic levels but also the distribution of 
income, welfare and opportunities, the 
relationship between remittances and 
development is going to be analysed in this 
section where households’ and the whole 
country’s perspective are treated separately 
(Mckinnon 1973). 
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From the household point of view, a first 
important effect is the poverty alleviation 
(Adams 2002). Actually, the level of 
domestic disposable income increases since 
remittances go directly from the migrant to 
his family or friends. Evidence has showed 
that both the poverty headcount ratio, and the 
level of poverty depth (poverty gap ratio) or 
that of poverty severity can be affected (Ray 
1998). Of course, the level of remittances 
matters a lot in enhancing such an effect. For 
example, it has been confirmed that the 
higher it is the steeper the headcount ratio’s 
increase. At the same time, the initial level of 
the headcount ratio matters a lot. The higher 
to start with it is, the stronger the effect of 
remittances on poverty (Adams 2003). These 
results have been obtained thanks to poverty 
simulations, even if one of their weaknesses 
is the risk of incurring in reverse causality 
problems. Cross-country regressions have 
been more efficient in dealing with that, 
showing a decrease of the poverty gap ratio 
equal to 3.5% (Adams & Page 2003). The 
same holds for household surveys, although 
the lack of proper data on remittances does 
not allow us to rely on their conclusions. 
Strictly linked to the issue of poverty 
reduction is that of inequality, because 
income growth is valuable for recipient 
households but even more important is the 
distribution of its benefits among different 
groups in society. Inequality is usually 
empirically measured by the Gini coefficient 
(Ray 1998). Household studies have showed 
opposing results in terms of correlation, 
either positive or negative, and dynamics, 
either in favour or not of a U-shape 
relationship between migration and 
inequality (Mannan & Krueger 2000). The 
variety of these conclusions depends on three 
important factors. The first one is the initial 
level of inequality, since the higher it is, the 
stronger is the evidence in favour of a 
negative relationship.  
The second one consists of the nature 
and the level of the migration costs, where 
they can depend on the network component 
and/or the distance between the sending and 
the receiving country. It has been 
demonstrated that the higher they are the 
lower the probability that the poorest migrate 
and, consequently, remit. As far as this last 
issue is concerned, the literature (Rapoport & 
Docquier 2004).  has recently dealt with the 
so called ‘trickle down’ effect that is the 
effect of the increasing migration flows on 
the reduction of migration costs, hence a 
widespread possibility to migrate, for the 
poorest people too (Carrington et. Al 1996). 
If evidence confirmed the validity and the 
sustainability of such an effect for recipient 
countries, the results concerning inequality 
and remittances would be much more 
homogenous (even because in the last few 
years the trends concerning migration have 
been increasing almost everywhere). 
The third effect on household income 
depends on how remittances are spent. They 
can be indeed consumed, saved or invested. 
Remittances are an important source of 
income for many low and middle income 
households but how this money is used 
affects in a different, and sometimes opposite 
way, people’s welfare. As far as consumption 
is concerned, remittances can be good in 
terms of consumption smoothing, but we will 
see that on the other side, at aggregate level, 
an increase of the magnitude of consumption 
can foster inflation. And even the first effect 
does not always hold. Positive evidence 
exists for remittances that are countercyclical 
(Ozden & Schiff 2006) or pushed by 
insurance motives (Lucas & Stark 1985), but 
this could be the case of middle income 
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families, since first of all poor families would 
not be able to send their individuals abroad, 
and secondly even if this were the case, their 
consumption pattern would remain the same, 
or would change in a much slower way 
(Lowell & DeLa Garza 2000).   
On the other hand, households can 
decide to save or invest remittance transfers. 
According to the World Bank, five factors 
would condition the prevalence of that. First 
of all, the household’s degree of dependence 
on remittances. The more households are 
dependent, the less they save. Secondly, the 
nature of the recipient, since women are more 
likely to prefer a smoother consumption path. 
Third, the existence of a conditional targeted 
destination upon the transfers. Fourth, the 
income level of the recipient family or the 
presence of credit constraints. However, 
whatever is the reason why households 
decide to invest, and taking in mind the 
welfare perspective, according to which an 
extra dollar of investment is only better than 
an extra dollar of present consumption if the 
marginal social value of investment is greater 
than its marginal private value, investments 
can be either destined to physical capital or 
human capital.  
Under the former case, investments can 
be fostered by the migrant himself or by his 
household. In regard to this, remittances can 
enhance entrepreneurship in the recipient 
country, being allocated in construction, 
housing, agricultural production and 
technology. On the other hand, the latter 
framework is fundamental especially from an 
endogenous growth perspective: relaxing 
liquidity constrains would impinge on human 
capital formation (education and health). 
Remittances may be conditional upon a loan 
agreement, or they can be inserted in a 
household’s forward looking framework.  
In the former case, the migrant, after 
having repaid for the educational 
expenditures incurred by his family, 
continues to send remittances in order to 
provide education to the new young 
generation. While, in the latter case, the 
recipient household decides to allocate its 
new entries in children’ education. From this 
perspective, remittances can be a good 
instrument in decreasing child labor, too. But, 
although remittances are fungible and 
education has a relatively high income 
elasticity, so one would expect remittances to 
have a significant positive effect on the 
educational attainment of children from 
households with migrant members, a recent 
sociological argument (Hanson & Woodruff 
2002) indicates that the absence of one of the 
parents can be detrimental on children’ 
schooling achievements when credit 
constraints are the most binding (Cox & 
Ureta 2003).. So, at the end, even from an 
endogenous growth perspective, the 
conclusions are unclear. 
A last but not least effect of remittances 
on households concerns labor supply. A high 
dependency degree on remittances, 
accompanied by economic uncertainty and 
asymmetric information, would lead 
households to incur in the so called moral 
hazard (Chami et al 2003; 2006) problem. 
Instead of exploiting the possible positive 
externalities related to remittances, the 
recipients would prefer to bribe the migrant 
substituting effort with leisure. This would 
have negative effects in terms of growth. 
However, a recent work (Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz 2006) has argued that the probability 
of the moral hazard would depend on the 
level of financial development, too. The 
higher it is, the stronger the former would be, 
as a consequence of the fact that less stringent 
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liquidity constraints would discourage more 
labor supply. 
Linked to the previous arguments is the 
so called multiplier effect. Either remittances 
are consumed or invested, they can have an 
important multiplier effect (Cuc et. al 2005). 
One remittance dollar spent even for basic 
needs will stimulate retail sales, which then 
stimulates output and employment. Some 
studies have found that one dollar sent from 
migrants abroad would boost the recipient 
country’s GNP by an increase that ranges 
from 1.8 to 2.553. However such multiplier 
effects would occur where output is 
constrained by insufficient demand. But in 
many developing countries where 
unemployment (or underemployment) is 
widespread, hiring costs are high, and the 
demand side has increased as a consequence 
of the new transfers, inflationary shocks are 
likely to occur, so stifling the growth effects.  
Another consequence of the low speed of 
reaction of the supply side in the recipient 
country may be a trade balance deficit. It 
consists of a disproportionate increase of 
imports in order to neutralize the increased 
internal demand. Except for the demand for 
imports towards cheap capital goods that can 
be used as substitutes for other imports and/or 
to produce exportable goods, this effect is 
detrimental for the recipient country’s 
growth. 
Similar to the ‘boomerang effect’ just 
mentioned, though differently motivated, is 
the so called ‘Dutch disease’. This refers to a 
steep currency appreciation that the recipient 
country sustains as a consequence of a 
surplus in the balance of payments due to the 
large inflows of remittances. As a result, once 
again, the country would suffer of an 
emerging lower export competitiveness, due 
to the deterioration of its terms of trade. 
However, neither empirical results have 
confirmed the previous effects (OECD 
2005), nor theoretically it has been shown 
(Docquier & Rapoport 2003)  that the 
conditions required for impoverishing 
transfers to materialize are so weak exchange 
(Glytsos 2002). It is, indeed, plausible 
assuming that a developing country’ liquidity 
statement is overdrawn so that remittances 
can relax its deficit (Brown 1997). Their 
impact would be immediate since their use is 
not tied to a particular project with high 
import content, they bear no interest and they 
do not have to be repaid (Mannan & Kozlov 
2005). 
From a financial perspective, the 
following effects are of great value, too. First 
of all, credit worthiness can be improved by 
country’s remittances, thereby enhancing the 
country’s access to international capital 
markets. The World Bank points out that a 
key indebtness indicator, such as the ratio of 
debt to exports of goods and services, would 
increase significantly if remittances were 
excluded from the denominator. Two studies 
concerning Lebanon and Haiti have 
confirmed that if remittance transfers were 
included, their credit ratings would increase 
by two notches. Secondly, another way for 
the recipient country of collecting 
international capitals is also through the 
securitization of future remittances.  
Using this structured financial 
technique, several banks in developing 
countries have been able to raise relatively 
cheap and long term financing from 
international capital markets. This has 
happened in Brazil for example and in 
Turkey, too. Other two important arguments 
have also been recently proposed. The first 
one argues that stable and a cyclical 
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remittances, reducing macroeconomic 
instability, decrease the probability of 
financial crises in emerging markets 
(Bugamelli & Paterno 2005). By financial 
crises, current account reversals are taken 
into consideration, defined as dramatic 
adjustments of current account deficit that 
may be triggered by sudden stops of foreign 
capital. They, in turn, can be due to foreign 
investors’ loss in the face of worsening 
fundamentals, such as lower reserves 
(decreasing stock of international reserves 
over GDP) or higher external debt 
(increasing stock of external debt over GDP).  
The authors have found that a high level 
of remittances, as a ratio of GDP, makes the 
effects of these shocks less stringent, 
meaning a lower probability that foreign 
investors suddenly flee out of emerging 
markets. Moreover, a threshold effect of 
remittances has been provided, since the 
mechanisms just described would be much 
stronger when remittances are above 4% of 
GDP. If we consider the figures provided by 
the OECD in its last report, the last country 
among the top 30 with the highest level of 
remittances received as a share of GDP is 
Bangladesh with its 6.6 % of GDP. We can 
reasonably define these two points per cent 
(at least) as an encouraging perspective as far 
as macro stability is concerned 
On the other hand, the second one is 
related to the role of pro-cyclical remittances 
as financial substitutes in countries with a 
lower financial depth (Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz 2006). The authors back up that, in 
less developed financial systems, remittances 
can be used to overcome liquidity constraints, 
providing the enough collateral to borrow 
and/or finance their investments. If these 
results are going to be confirmed by future 
works, this would be very important from a 
theoretically perspective since it is as if we 
stated that from a financial development’s 
point of view, remittances can enhance 
dynamic convergence. From an endogenous 
point of view, if we consider countries with a 
similar level of initial human capital but 
different income levels, countries with a 
lower income per head should grow faster, 
since the further they are from the 
equilibrium the faster they should run to 
catch up.  
This is what we mean by dynamic 
convergence. And from an empirically 
perspective, too since we would be able to 
understand why remittances effects are so 
controversial, hence proceed towards 
different assumptions. Still from an indirect 
endogenous perspective, the relationship 
between remittances and brain drain has been 
considered (Beine et. al 2001). 
Unfortunately, until now, not so much work 
has been done and a few articles have shown 
that remittances, that could in principle 
compensate the recipient country for the loss 
of human capital, do not contribute to this in 
any way. 
Finally, a last detrimental 
macroeconomic implication of remittance 
transfers is the possibility that terroristic 
groups United Nations (2002) could divert 
these resources from potentially positive uses 
to suspicious purposes. This is why more and 
more attention has to be paid especially to 
informal transfer channels and why the IMF, 
during the Second Convention on Hawala in 
2004, has pressed for more efficient national 
supervisory systems. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
On the occasion of the High Level 
Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development (United Nations 2002), the 
Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi 
Annan declared ‘We are only beginning to 
learn how to make migration work more 
consistently for development. Each of us 
holds a piece of the migration puzzle, but 
none has the whole picture. It is time to start 
putting it together’. We reasonably think that 
an important piece of this puzzle are 
migrants’ remittances. Because their flows to 
developing countries have steadily increased 
in the last twenty years, leaving behind both 
the Official Development Assistance and the 
FDI. Because they can play a potential key 
role for recipient countries’ economies both 
from a micro and macro perspective. And, 
finally, because empirical evidence has 
showed so far that their benefits seem to 
prevail over negative effects. 
In this article we have presented the 
kernel of the migration literature on 
remittances. We started from their three most 
debated features: stability, cyclicality and 
sustainability. We then moved to the motives 
driving remittances and, finally, their 
relationship with development. Both 
sustainability and cyclicality are the most 
controversial issues, as they are probably the 
most critical in terms of economic 
development. The former is fundamental 
from an endogenous point of view. In terms 
of dynamic convergence, if sustainability 
holds, less financial developed countries 
could redeem themselves fostering riskier 
and more productive investments, 
‘substituting’ their liquidity constraints with 
pro-cyclical remittances.  
On the other hand, from a ‘brain gain’ 
perspective, if the inverse relation between 
the time spent abroad and intention to remit 
is going to be confirmed in future works, the 
‘brain circulation could be beneficial both 
from a human capital and a remittances point 
of view (Mccormick & Wahba 1996). This 
would imply that, from a policy perspective, 
the countries of origin should become much 
more and more interested in attracting back 
home their brains from abroad, meaning 
implementing sound programs towards this 
object, such as temporary visa permits, 
research allowances, benefits bound by the 
return, bilateral agreements between the two 
countries or the universities (Mishra 2006). 
Cyclicality is much more complicated to 
deal with, since it is often strongly related to 
the motives why people remit. But once 
reverse causality has been addressed, counter 
cyclicality, a cyclicality or pro-cyclicality, 
may have distinct but equally important 
results in terms of development. Pro-
cyclicality can boost investments 
overcoming liquidity constraints. A 
cyclicality can prevent the country from 
current account crises and counter cyclicality 
can provide macro stability. As future work, 
country analyses need to be conducted, 
especially because the change in the cyclical 
components of national GDP, the amount of 
remittances a country receives and other 
macro variables are country specific. 
Furthermore, cyclical properties may 
change through time and migrants’ remitting 
behaviour can be influenced by national 
migration policies, too. The literature is 
unevenly distributed with regard to country 
analyses. A lot of work has been, indeed, 
done on the Latin migrants living in US but, 
on the other side, the interest for the MED-
MENA migrants who live in the European 
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Union has just began. This suggests future 
works are oriented towards this geographical 
perspective. 
However, either future work or country 
policies need reliable data to deal with, and 
this is not a migration literature’s prerogative. 
If the figures are not able to describe what 
really happens, or if just one side of the coin 
is provided, the ‘whole picture of the 
migration puzzle’ will be hardly depicted. In 
particular, as far remittances are concerned, 
efforts have to be made towards three goals: 
improving a much more formal and binding 
definition of migrants’ remittances, so that 
national central banks and statistical offices 
cannot have any doubts about that; providing 
banking systems and wire services on a 
migrant scale, so to stem informal transfers; 
and, finally, addressing estimations of the 
irregular flows in the meanwhile (Omarini 
2006) price.  
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